What happens if China is submitted to the enhanced tier of the National Security Act

It has been widely reported that Chinese state-backed hackers are responsible for cyber attacks on the Electoral Commission and four serving MPs. Suella Braverman, who passed the National Security Act has said that “it’s abundantly clear that China is a hostile state and poses an unprecedented threat to our national security.”

For their part, the Chinese Embassy has called these accusations “completely fabricated and malicious slanders.”

Oliver Dowden, Deputy Prime Minister, has now said the government is actively considering whether to place people acting on behalf of China under the enhanced tier within the National Security Act.

The National Security Act 2023 has two main provisions. The first is that it provides law enforcement and agencies with new tools to act against perceived threats of espionage and interference.

The second is that it introduces a Foreign Influence Registration scheme whereby agents acting on behalf of a foreign power are required to register that they are carrying out political activities, the political influence tier, or the enhanced tier which “gives the Secretary of State the power to require registration of a broader range of activities for specified foreign powers or foreign power-controlled entities where this is necessary to protect the safety of interests of the UK.”

The Act effectively gives the Secretary of State broad powers to insist on additional scrutiny. As the government’s factsheet puts it

The enhanced tier of FIRS gives the Secretary of State the power to require registration of a broader range of activities for specified countries, parts of countries or foreign government-controlled entities where this is necessary to protect the safety of interests of the UK.

The government is unlikely to directly interfere with the legitimate business of universities in student recruitment, exchanges, or in research partnerships through the National Security Act.

The specific restrictions on study are aimed at identified individuals under the Act while research partnerships fall largely under a separate legislative regime. The only mention of research within the entire Act is under the prohibited places clause which is meant to restrict access to sensitive sites.

Should the government choose to elevate China in its entirety to the enhanced tier of the Act the political fallout could be significant.

Although direct intervention is unlikely a further cooling of relationships could have long-term impacts for UK-China partnerships. In an era where there is already increasing tension around IP theft, espionage, and research security, this would undoubtedly add more pressure to universities’ arrangements with partners in one of the UK’s most important economic partners.

Former Conservative Party Leader Iain Duncan Smith has said “We must now enter a new era of relations with China, dealing with the contemporary Chinese Communist party as it really is, not as we would wish it to be,” and it feel like this debate could herald a significant change in tone, if not yet a significantly different approach, in UK-China relations.