An autonomous agitator within the corporate ambition of the university

Jim is an Associate Editor (SUs) at Wonkhe

A few weeks ago, Russell Group SUs gathered at Queens University Belfast SUs. As well as admiring what’s easily the UK’s most impressive SU building, they were treated to a presentation on how QUB SU works.

It’s always been a part – a legal part – of the university. So it’s easy to think it suffers from not being autonomous or compromised over representation. But the evidence is the opposite – it benefits from being part of the university while maintaining clear independence in its voice. It’s like a 19 year-old living at home.

Over the past few years, there have been any number of discussions – especially in England – about gaps and overlaps in regulation and expectation between students’ unions and their university.

That makes sense – universities are more concerned with the student experience than previously, and many of the activities that students unions have led on previously are now understood to have real (direct or indirect) educational value.

But in many cases – on everything from Prevent to sexual misconduct, from access and participation activity to background processes like administration and infrastructure or student conduct procedures, one of the (arguably unnecessary) complexities has concerned the legal separateness of students unions.

That separateness has a history and context – and the complexities are arguably the price to pay for having an autonomous and independent student organisation. But in an era of tough finances for the sector, and as SUs start to reduce budgets, that legal separateness may be a luxury – and one that is unnecessary in its current form.

In particular, all SUs carry a set of fixed infrastructure costs – although all SUs have a different set of the costs they bear rather than those carried by their university – that are costs not directly related to the charitable mission of the SU.

As budgets reduce, the justification for carrying a larger proportion of the budget on such fixed costs – rather than spending it on students – reduces.

Universities across the country are being encouraged to collaborate. Students’ unions have often explored collaboration with each other. But what if the most obvious collaboration was the one on each SU’s doorstep?

Small and specialist

One of the questions I’ve been asked a lot over the years concerns the very smallest students’ unions.

Often found in FE colleges or small and specialist providers, the question usually surrounds their legal status – or indeed their existence.

In these scenarios, we’re usually looking at an unincorporated association, a budget which is run as a budget line in the provider, and if there is any space or property, that tends to be owned by the provider.

And to the extent to which there’s any infrastructure, administration, property or employment going on, it’s handled by the provider as part of its activities.

As such if I think about the advice that tends to find its way to the often lone officer or provider staff member thinking about SU development, that advice tends to be – you don’t have to register as a Charity, or have a Board, because you don’t really exist.

That advice has never really made sense to me – because the Education Act 1994 does recognise an association of students that fit certain criteria as a students’ union.

And the exercise that the Office for Students (OfS) recently carried out in England to discern which providers had an SU confirms that those providers thought they had one – one that, in terms of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, was capable of being directly regulated against a distinct set of duties, however small or fledging, and however practically integrated into the provider.

Excepted proves the rule

If an SU of that sort does “exist”, it is likely that in England and Wales, the Charity Commission would view it as an “excepted” charity – which means they don’t have to register or submit annual returns.

That’s because a charity is excepted if its income is £100,000 or less and it is in one of various groups – one of which is a students’ unions.

Two questions flow from that. What happens when the SU’s income goes over £100,000 and it’s still practically highly integrated into the provider? And does “support in kind” count?

On the latter question, the Charities Act 2011 sets up the regulation on excepted charities in relation to “gross income” – in-kind support, such as donated goods, services, or volunteer time, is typically not included as it does not involve actual monetary transactions.

Its “board” would be whoever the constitution puts in the job of the management and administration of the Charity – it could straightforwardly remain unincorporated, and no external trustees are required, although that could help.

One thing that happens a lot in small SUs is a struggle to be “independent”. That often seems to manifest in a desire for a separate bank account, or a different HR policy, or their computers or whatever. It can mean what capacity they have goes into creating a sort of “My First Post Office” rather than focussing on the stuff that matters.

And anyway – if the SU imagined above was to grow such that its income topped £100,000, there’s then a very interesting set of questions about the relationship between the SU and the provider.

From exempt to excepted

Prior to the Charities Act 2006, students unions were exempt (from registration) charities, regulated via their parent institutions. The act required SUs to register with the Charity Commission, obtain their own charity number, and be directly regulated by the commission.

That’s partly because the Charities Act 2006 defines a “connected institution” as one which is controlled by, or a body corporate in which a substantial interest is held by, another body – in our case the university/college.

Students’ unions couldn’t be connected institutions under the definition provided because they were not typically controlled by their parent institution (the university) or its trustees in the way the Act specified.

But things changed in 2011.

In the Charities Act 1993 the Charity Commission was allowed (in section 96(6)) to issue directions uniting two or more charities under a single registration as long as two or more charities were or were to be administered by the same trustees.

This enabled charities with shared trusteeship to be registered and administered as one entity, simplifying compliance and governance while preserving their separate legal identities. No SU is that close in its governance.

But the Charities Act 2011 broadened the ability of the Charity Commission to issue directions as to what is (or is not) a separate charity.

It gained the power to direct that an institution established for any special purposes of or in connection with a charity (being charitable purposes) is to be treated as forming part of that charity.

This is not the same as charities merging. But it does mean that the Commission can link charities because of the service they provide.

Linking thinking

Linked charities prepare only one set of accounts and trustees’ annual report, and share a charity number (if either have to be registered). Once charities are linked, one will be the reporting charity, producing only one set of accounts for all of the linked charities.

The accounts must still report separately on the assets and activities of each linked charity, including how they provide public benefit.

For this to occur, the charities must have a close administrative connection. The relationship must be sufficient to warrant shared registration, but they must still operate as distinct legal entities. This means linked charities retain separate governance structures but may share certain aspects – like trustees, resources, or operational functions.

The framework emphasises operational connectedness—shared resources, alignment of financial systems, or interdependence—without mandating full governance control by one party over the other.

That feels very much like how an SU operates now both in large and small providers – and increasingly how many SUs would like to operate to reduce their operating costs.

To be “linked,” the Charity Commission typically looks for:

  • Administrative integration: For example, shared staff, financial systems, or facilities.
  • Shared objectives: Both charities should have closely aligned or complementary purposes, which is the case for a students’ union and its university (e.g., advancing education).

Linking would not legally require the university to:

  • Appoint trustees for the students’ union.
  • Directly manage union activities.

Instead, to be treated as “linked,” the following would typically suffice:

  • Operational and financial integration: The university might provide financial management, or deliver administrative support (e.g., IT, HR, and payroll).
  • Strategic oversight: While the union retains its own trustees, the university could influence high level decision-making via funding conditions or through formal agreements like Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs).
  • Shared reporting: The union and university might consolidate aspects of their reporting particularly where the union relies on university support.

So in theory, a university could oversee the union’s operations through mechanisms like budget approval, shared services, and compliance monitoring without assuming direct governance or appointing trustees.

And of course broadly, most universities already do much of the above because the Education Act 1994 requires them to do so.

A new kind of relationship

So let’s imagine that – partly as a way of saving on costs and dispensing with daft stuff like “lease agreements” for SU buildings, the following applied:

  • The SU does not own much property, equipment, or other assets; most provided by the university
  • The SU operates financially as part of the university, relying on its budget being allocated and overseen by the university
  • The SU does not employ its own staff; instead, staff are employed and contracted by the university
  • The SU is democratically and representative because it complies with the requirements of the Education Act 1994, including having a Code of Practice and an MoU setting out its governance and budgetary framework

The point is that the Education Act 1994 creates a baseline of both autonomy and connectedness:

  • The objects are aligned.
  • The governing body of the university is required to oversee the SU’s governance, ensure its budget and finances are properly managed, and approve its Code of Practice.
  • The university has significant responsibility for ensuring the SU operates in compliance with legal and democratic principles

Crucially, if the SU was formally “linked”, it would in theory remove any need to charge VAT for the formal provision of services in either direction, resolve many of the tax-based catering issues (which are all about an argument over whether the SU is “part of” the university or not), and there would be potential significant savings on finance, HR (and where separately provided or charged for) IT and rent, as well as savings on compliance costs – including external audit.

Many would worry about autonomy – but two signature examples spring to mind.

Belfast and Enschede

Queen’s University Belfast Students’ Union (QUBSU) is not (and has never been) legally separate from the university – it derives its existence and authority from the university’s statutes.

Consequently, it operates under the university’s governance framework, with amendments to its constitution requiring approval from the university senate.

Yet despite the structural integration, QUBSU maintains its democratic and representative legitimacy through several key mechanisms:

  • The union is led by students, for students, with elected student officers representing the student body and leading the union’s activities.
  • All students are automatically members of the union, ensuring comprehensive representation and inclusivity.
  • The union council, comprising elected representatives, serves as the governing body of the SU, acting in accordance with the university’s statutes and with the approval of the Senate.

These structures ensure that, even within the university’s legal framework, QUBSU operates democratically, with student representation at its core. This balance allows the union to function as an effective advocate for student interests while aligning with the university’s governance – and saving on costs like separate legal advice.

Pretty much all of the SU’s management time and formal budget is spent on the mission – and given its often testy campaigning work and arguably what looks like the best SU building in the UK, few might argue that it is compromised either on autonomy and connectedness.

In the Netherlands, Twente SU is an independent foundation with its own accounts and financial reserves. But pretty much all of financial transactions are managed by and through the university’s systems for efficiency, along with HR, admin, IT and so on.

The relationship is governed by a “Covenant”, which details the areas over which the SU has full control, others where it has consultation rights and operational matters handled by the university, allowing the SU to focus all of its resource and management time on student activity.

Could linking happen?

So would the Commission allow a “linking” of this sort? It’s not clear.

It may have a perception that SUs are more autonomous than they really are practically. OfS – which in England would become the “principal regulator” – may resist. And while there is evidence of universities as exempt charities having “linked” charities, there are not many.

There is no evidence that the Commission has approved a registered charity “linking” with one that is exempt since 2011 – which would in theory see an SU no longer regulated by the Commission.

On the other hand, the opportunity to remove a layer of costs via audit and registration – and in doing so realise wider synergies over admin and infrastructure, is compelling in the current financial context.

As well as OfS’ drive to encourage universities to save money, the Commission says:

Research has shown that charities who work together can bring a wide range of benefits to themselves and their beneficiaries.

Of the charities surveyed, over a third recorded an improvement with their service delivery following a merger. The most common reasons for merging with another charity are:

to increase efficiency

to rescue a charity in difficulty

to prevent duplication and improve services

A new kind of relationship in the student interest

The reason that, in the last Parliament, ministers thought that SUs needed to be regulated separately to universities was related to their legal separateness – but it ignored the practical, administrative and strategic integration between SUs and universities.

That created the daft idea that there could be two codes of practice on free speech in a university, and set up small SUs in registered providers with legal duties they were never going to be able to handle.

The reality about everything from free speech legislation to things like the Prevent duty, compliance with B Conditions on student engagement, and emerging regulation over harassment and sexual misconduct is that there is a closer alignment on process and strategy between SUs and universities than ever before – all while still requiring representative and democratic independence.

The best metaphor has always been that SUs are like 19 year olds living at home – they are adults, they’re autonomous, but in their parents’ house they have to play by their parents’ rules. Establishing them as linked charities to their university would simplify a lot of things, match the “Clapham Omninus” perception of the relationship between the SU and the university, and reflect the realities of the relationship between all SUs – tiny and huge – here in 2025.

If the Commission feels it can’t, the legislation should change such that it can.

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