New data from DfE shows just how limited the options outside of higher education really are for young people. David Kernohan reads along

What people do after completing school (or as they reach 18) has become politically charged.
The number of young people not in employment, education, or training (NEET – a measure that refers, confusingly, to the 16-25 age group) is at a historic high; and there are concerns both about the availability and attractiveness of alternatives to the academic route, and the number of young people successfully entering employment (much less a “good job” with prospects) has fallen sharply.
Various interpretations of these factors compete for our attention: are we facing a problem with employing young people, or are we less able to sell the idea that further study will make them more employable? Are people sticking with higher education because the alternatives aren’t as good, or do we have a real problem with recruitment to apprenticeships that may be better for some groups of pupils? And how do pupil characteristics – in terms of disadvantage or special educational needs – affect life chances in those first years after school?
The Department for Education has published four sets of statistics that attempt to track what people do in these important early years. There’s information on
Let’s start with the year after GCSEs – specifically the mainstream state school cohort that left key stage four in 2023-24. The default is another education destination – 86.2 per cent of young people are still studying or in training that following year, up 0.3 percentage points from last year. Some do start employment: 2.1 per cent (down 0.5 percentage points). Others take what we might see as the middle route of an apprenticeship: 3 per cent (down 0.3 percentage points).
After a post-pandemic dip, the proportion in education is growing again after two consecutive years of decreases and is moving back towards the pre-pandemic norm of around 87 per cent. Employment rates are historically low – other than the pandemic cohort who completed in 2019-20 it is the lowest in the last 10 years, and apprenticeship rates are below the historic average too. We need to be clear that these non-education routes are taken by very small minorities at this point and are thus more sensitive to the kind of year-on-year statistical noise.
Importantly, pupils with a disadvantaged background (a group that includes the free school meals marker, experience of alternative or referral unit provision, or care experience) are much more likely to have no sustained destination (to be NEET) and are very slightly more likely to be in employment. We see a similar pattern for pupils with educational needs.
If you leave education at 16, you are unlikely to return to education or training. This is why lifelong learning becomes important in addressing persistent NEET status, and why it needs to perform a dual role: reintroducing people to learning after a negative early experience, and giving them job-ready skills to improve their immediate prospects. Alan Milburn’s report is very likely to recommend an increase in educational support for precisely this group: NEET at 16 is the start of a pathway that leads to longer-term unemployment and underemployment.
While 93 per cent of young people had a sustained employment education or training destination one year after completing their Key State 4 studies, just 80.1 per cent could say the same three years out.
This decrease should not surprise anyone, as it reflects the fact that since 2015 it has been a legal requirement in England to participate in some form of education or training for the equivalent of one day a week. While one day a week is not, in and of itself, a sustained destination, most pupils do substantially more. What we are seeing is that the end of 16-19 education, for pupils who do not go on to higher education or an apprenticeship, does not tend to lead directly to sustained employment.
It is tempting to see the answer to this question as more training: as, while the proportion not in education, employment, or training three years out has risen slightly over time (pandemic effects and a change in methodology make it hard to put a reliable number on that) that proportion has been a little under 20 per cent. And, looking back further, the proportion of a cohort five years after level 4 without a sustainable destination is broadly similar. People in education at around 17 or around 19 tend to be in education or employment at around 21 as well – those who are not are less likely to be.
However, this ignores what we do know about recent issues with employers hiring young people. There are many potential reasons for this: it has become more expensive (what with having to pay young people a decent wage these days), there are signs of economic instability, and some employers are waiting and seeing on AI. There is likely all of this and more going on, but the general economic sluggishness feels most persuasive.
During previous economic downturns there has been an established trend that has seen people turn to training or education in the absence of employment. This doesn’t seem to have happened this time, but depending on your personal p(doom) logistics problems linked to conflict in the middle east and the embargo on Russia, a global crash as unsustainable AI investment unwinds, or continued anaemic UK growth could all get us into that space soon. And will the retraining trend still hold up?
Of those who left 16 to 19 study in 2022-23, 63.4 per cent are currently learning at level 4 or higher. That’s down 1.2 percentage points over the last reporting period.
You may recall Keir Starmer’s target to have two-thirds of people under 25 with some kind of level 4 and above education or training by 2040. This measure is not the CHEPS-25 data that underpins that target (it refers only to learners under 21), but it is a useful marker on the way to that target, and the drop in this proportion will have caused concern at DfE.
Breaking down that top line a little, 58.4 per cent were studying for a degree, 2.5 per cent were in a level 4 (or higher) apprenticeships, and 2.4 per cent were studying for other qualifications at level 4 or 5. The time series here are based on recalculations due to data presentational changes, but the proportion doing a degree has dropped from the pandemic high point and now sits at around the 2017-18 level. As with much participation data it is not clear how much of this change is an unwinding of the pandemic effects and how much is a longer term trend.
The “other level 4 or 5” proportion has been falling steadily, and this trend (despite the advent of Higher Technical Qualifications) has stubbornly persisted. Meanwhile the proportion in higher apprenticeships has grown, albeit very slightly – though this is now double the 2016-17 proportion.
Disadvantage remains the best predictor for not making it to level 4 or above – just 56.1 per cent of that part of the cohort got there, compared to 64.8 per cent of their peers. There is a marked difference in those getting to a “top third” higher education provider (8.8 per cent as compared to 18.1 per cent) as you might expect, but there is a similar difference in progression to apprenticeships (1.4 per cent as compared to 2.8 per cent). Both the Russell Group and apprenticeships appear to be routes linked to comparative advantage – the traditional work on access and participation in the sector is doing the heavy lifting in raising aspirations and driving social mobility.
We don’t have comments currently on Wonkhe, but if we did I know someone would mention that white British pupils with disadvantaged backgrounds are far less likely than most other groups to progress to L4 or above – just 44.4 per cent got there, with just 39.6 per cent studying for a degree. There are a lot of white British pupils with disadvantaged backgrounds, who are also disproportionately more likely to attend educational settings (like referral and alternative provision) that do not prepare pupils for higher level study, and disproportionately more likely to have family backgrounds where low levels of education are a historic norm. The action here needs to be to address the background economic and social disadvantage alongside raising aspirations – difficult work.
There is a persistent policy belief that university-level study crowds out other routes beyond compulsory level study. The reality is much more painful: without significant investment in improving non-academic routes and encouraging industry to take on and develop young people in the workforce, it remains the most likely route to a sustained destination, and the most likely route to the kind of “good job” that has prospects and progression.
While employers are demanding higher-level skills, there is not yet a reliable alternative route to gaining them that has any traction with the disadvantaged groups that tend to end up with sustained NEET status. Higher education is attractive to young people, but it is not accessible to those without a family background able to support the rising cost of study. In reality, employers and higher education providers both represent part of the solution that would drive us towards more employable, and more employed young people from every background.

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